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The author argues that liberalism does not provide a
meaningful standard for assessing whether immigration
laws are just. In the absence of a justice standard,
immigration laws occupy an amoral realm. Varying
strands of liberal theory about membership in society
do converge around the humanitarian ideal that some
people are so needy that they must be admitted on a
moral basis. The humanitarian consensus, however, is
unhelpful for most of the broad societal debates about
immigration, and is a front for discursive cohesion
without any underlying agreement. Humanitarianism is
a pragmatic tool for shifting law and policy, but must be
used with caution because of its foundation in
inequality.
L’auteur argumente que le libéralisme ne pourvoie pas
de critère significatif pour juger si les lois de
l’immigration sont justes. Dans l’absence d’un critère
de justice, les lois de l’immigration occupent un
domaine amoral. Des positions variables de la théorie
libérale sur l’appartenance à la société convergent
autour de l’idéal humanitaire, considérant certains gens
tellement nécessiteux qu’ils doivent être admis sur une
base morale. Le consensus humanitaire est, pourtant,
inutile pour la plupart du débat sociétal sur
l’immigration, et constitue une façade pour la cohésion
discursive sans aucun accord sous-jacent.
L’humanitarisme est un outil pragmatique pour
changer la loi et la politique, mais il doit être utilisé
avec précaution parce qu’il se base sur l’inégalité.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
Immigration is a contentious political topic in prosperous
Western nations at the close of the twentieth century. As barriers to
trade and financial movements are being challenged and dismantled,
and technologies of communication and transportation are shrinking the
globe, barriers to the movement of people have remained rigid. Outside
the globe-trotting business class and the few citizens-of-the-world who
hold multiple passports, permanent movement between nations remains
relatively difficult. Birth in a prosperous Western nation is, in Joseph
Carens’s phrase, the contemporary equivalent of feudal privilege.1 The
immigration debate in popular discourse takes many forms. Debates
about the status of guest workers in Europe,2 about the implications of
British nationality law,3 or the burgeoning “illegal” population in the
United States4 all draw out different perspectives on questions of
membership and belonging and the appropriateness of various
immigration law provisions. The seven years of almost unabated public
consultation on immigration law that Canadians have experienced,5 and
1 See J.H. Carens, “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders” (1987) 49 Rev. Pol. 251
at 252 [hereinafter “Aliens and Citizens”].
2 See W.R. Brubaker, ed., Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North
America (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1989).
3 See A. Dummett & A. Nicol, Subjects, Citizens, Aliens and Others: Nationality and Immigration
Law (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1990); and A. Paliwala, “Law and the Constitution of the
‘Immigrant’ in Europe: A UK Policy Perspective” in P. Fitzpatrick, ed., Nationalism, Racism and the
Rule of Law (Aldershot, U.K.: Dartmouth Press, 1995) 77.
4 See D.M. Grable, “Personhood Under the Due Process Clause: A Constitutional Analysis of
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996” (1998) 83 Cornell L.
Rev. 820.
5 In January 1999, the Canadian minister of citizenship and immigration released proposals for
new directions in Canadian immigration and citizenship laws for public consideration: see
Citizenship and Immigration Canada, News Release 99/01, “Minister Lucienne Robillard
Announces New Directions for Immigration and Refugee Protection Legislation and Policy” (6
January 1999), online: Citizenship and Immigration Canada <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/press/
99/9901-pre.html> (date accessed: 20 November 1999). This move followed public consultations in
1998 in response to the December 1997 report, which aimed to restructure Canadian immigration
legislation: see Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Not Just Numbers: A Canadian Framework for
Future Immigration (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 1997), online:
Citizenship and Immigration Canada <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/about/policy/lrag/emain.html>
(date accessed: 20 November 1999). This report itself marked the culmination of a year-long
consultative process.
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Australia’s recurring Asian immigration controversies,6 are symptoms of
similar tensions concerning the place of immigration in these societies.
At the heart of these debates, in each of their manifestations, is
the question of just immigration. How many people must we as
Germans, Americans, Australians, or Canadians admit to our
community? What is the fair number? Whom should we choose and how
should we choose them? The intransigence of this debate is explained in
part by the fact that liberal theory, the common denominator in public
and political thought in these prosperous nations, does not provide an
answer. This article explores how liberalism’s failure to answer the
question “how many is just” moves the question outside liberal morality
into an amoral arena. I describe this realm as amoral because the
absence of a liberal standard means shifts in immigration laws and
policies cannot be critiqued by comparison to an accepted notion of the
good. The realm is not immoral, but is outside the reach of agreed
versions of liberal morality, justice, and equality.
Part II of this article surveys liberal theory and demonstrates the
limitations of liberal morality. Part III considers the tension between
individualism and impartiality at the heart of liberal theory, which makes
it impossible to extrapolate liberal postulates as a whole into this amoral
realm. Parts IV through VI explore the consequences of these
characteristics of liberal theory for immigration law: narrow justice
standards are developed; discourses about refugees and other
immigrants are fractured and overlapping; and immigration law debates
are overshadowed by an illusory humanitarian consensus. This
humanitarianism occupies the amoral realm because it is grounded in
inequality and partiality and it provides agreement with no underlying
standard. Liberal discourses of justice and humanitarianism are both
inadequate for providing guidance in analyzing and reforming
immigration laws.
II.  THE LIBERAL POSITION
Classical liberal theory does not provide a standard for assessing
whether particular immigration laws are just because to do so requires
an understanding of justice that can span national boundaries. A just
standard in immigration law must take account of the needs and claims
6 See M.C. Ricklefs, “The Asian Immigration Controversies of 1984-85, 1988-89 and 1996-97:
A Historical Review” in G. Grey & C. Winter, eds., The Resurgence of Racism: Howard, Hanson and
the Race Debate (Clayton, Vic.: Monash University Publications, 1997) 39.
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of those outside the border as well as those inside. Classical liberal
conceptions of justice cannot do this because these theories assume a
political and legal community and proceed to consider questions of
justice as issues arising within the community.7 John Rawls and Ronald
Dworkin provide contemporary examples of this characteristic of
liberalism. In introducing his theory of justice, Rawls describes society as
“a closed system isolated from other societies.”8 Justice applies within
that closed system. The closed border is an assumption upon which the
theory is built, not something subject to examination within the theory.
For Dworkin, the just practice of law is a condition that arises
only in true associative communities—communities of principle.
Accordingly, he is more specific than Rawls about the character of the
community within which his theory applies. We can therefore infer that
closed borders are not merely assumed, but are assumed to be a virtue.
He explicitly denigrates a universal view of justice:
People might regard their political community as merely de facto [rather than truly
associative], not because they are selfish but because they are driven by a passion for
justice in the world as a whole and see no distinction between their community and
others. A political official who takes that view will think of his constituents as people he is
in a position to help because he has special means—those of his office—for helping them
that are not, regrettably, available for helping others. He will think his responsibilities to
his own community special in no other way, and therefore not greater in principle. So
when he can improve justice overall by subordinating the interests of his own
constituents, he will think it right to do so.9
In Dworkin’s view, to think of justice in universal terms is to
misunderstand the importance of one’s own community. While he writes
of the possibility of considering questions of justice as reaching beyond
borders, this is not his principal concern, nor should it be the concern of
members of a true associative community. He submits that “we treat
community as prior to justice and fairness in the sense that questions of
justice and fairness are regarded as questions of what would be just or
7 See D. Galloway, “Liberalism, Globalism, and Immigration” (1993) 18 Queen’s L.J. 266 at
269 [hereinafter “Liberalism, Globalism, and Immigration”], which discusses the extent to which
this assumption is typical of liberalism.
8 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971) at 8.
Defending his theory of justice in “Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical” (1985) 14 Phil. &
Pub. Aff. 223, Rawls elaborates, at 233, that “society is viewed as a more or less complete and self-
sufficient scheme of cooperation, making room within itself for all the necessities and activities of
life, from birth until death. … [C]itizens do not join society voluntarily but are born into it, where,
for our aims here, we assume they are to lead their lives.”
9 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986) at 209.
1999] Amorality and Humanitarianism 601
fair within a particular political group.”10 His argument stops short of
advocating closed borders because he does not address the immigration
context. However, when the determination of justice starts after the
community is constituted, it cannot also be used to determine the
membership of the community. Neither Rawls nor Dworkin articulate a
measure of justice that can cross borders.
Liberal theorists concerned about fairness in immigration laws of
course have sought to extend liberal conceptions of justice to the
immigration context. That is, they have attempted to extrapolate ideas of
justice developed on the basis of an assumed community to the question
of the constitution of the community itself. The result has been a debate
between those arguing that liberalism requires closed borders and those
arguing that liberalism requires open borders. That both positions can
be coherently articulated by thinking people concerned about justice
points to one of liberalism’s central tensions and underlines the tenacity
of the conflict.
Against the backdrop of assumed communities, closed border
theorists have an easier case to make: in order for a border to be
assumed, it must be assumed to be closed. Michael Walzer’s seminal
work on liberal justice theory conducts a detailed examination of the
assumed border of the community.11 He argues not only that closed
borders are just, but that closed borders are a necessary condition for
justice. For Walzer, the question of community membership precedes
the elaboration of his distributive justice concept. That is, his
understanding of justice takes the same starting point as Rawls and
Dworkin, but he undertakes a more detailed inquiry of this precondition
of justice. He asserts both that membership is not subject to justice
standards and that closure of communities is necessary to foster their
distinct cultures and characters. He writes that
[t]he distribution of membership is not pervasively subject to the constraints of justice.
Across a considerable range of decisions that are made, states are simply free to take in
strangers (or not) … . Admission and exclusion are at the core of communal
independence. They suggest the deepest meaning of self-determination. Without them,
there could not be communities of character, historically stable, ongoing associations of
men and women with some special commitment to one another and some special sense of
their common life.12
10 Ibid. at 208.
11 See M. Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic
Books, 1983) c. 2.
12 Ibid. at 61-62 [emphasis in original].
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Walzer builds his argument by drawing analogies between the nation
and what he calls “similar” associations: neighbourhoods, clubs, and
families.13 He claims that neighbourhoods in liberal societies can be
open to newcomers only because closure is provided for at the national
level. Like a club, admission to national membership should be
controlled, but departure must remain an open option. Drawing on the
family analogy, he notes that liberal immigration policies often make
membership more easily available to “ethnic relatives,” members of a
type of extended family.
Along with this staunch defence of the closed national
community, Walzer recognizes that the mutual-aid principle creates
particular duties to admit some outsiders whose need is for membership
itself, and cannot therefore be met by ceding territory to them or
exporting wealth. In an assertion that is perhaps paradoxical, Walzer
argues that a valid claim of asylum can never morally be denied, but a
sufficiently large number of refugee claimants will annul the duty of
mutual aid.14 In other words, even in the case of strictly humanitarian
claims for admission, not everyone should be allowed in. When a state is
faced with choosing among refugees, those who most resemble
community members should be admitted. Walzer links the limits of
mutual aid to community definition, stating that communities “depend
with regard to population on a sense of relatedness and mutuality.
Refugees must appeal to that sense. One wishes them success; but in
particular cases, with reference to a particular state, they may well have
no right to be successful.”15 While it is unclear how far Walzer believes
the principle of mutual aid obligates liberals to accommodate refugees,
or indeed asylum claimants,16 it is evident in his analysis that this duty
13 Ibid. at 36-43.
14 In Walzer’s analysis, an asylum claim is made by those fleeing political persecution who are
already within the nation’s borders; refugee claimants are still outside. See also L.M. Seidman,
“Fear and Loathing at the Border” in W.F. Schwartz, ed., Justice in Immigration (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1995) 136.
15 Walzer, supra note 11 at 50.
16 Walzer makes a distinction between these two groups that reflects, primarily, the distinction
enshrined in international refugee law between those seeking admission who are already in your
country (Walzer’s asylees) and those who are elsewhere, seeking admission to your country on
humanitarian grounds (Walzer’s refugees). This terminology is current in Europe and the United
States. In Canada and Australia, both groups are referred to in popular public discourse as refugees.
The international law definition of refugee, followed by most prosperous Western nations, is narrow
and idiosyncratic. The Final Act of the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of
Refugees and Stateless Persons, 28 July 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 at 152 (entered into force 22 April
1954) [hereinafter Convention] defines a refugee, in Article I(A)(2), as any person who,
[a]s a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of
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operates only at the margins of an otherwise justifiably closed
community. He states that “[t]he principle of mutual aid can only modify
and not transform admissions policies rooted in a particular
community’s understanding of itself.”17
Several aspects of Walzer’s defence of closed borders are open
to criticism.18 There are flaws in his analogies between liberal states and
neighbourhoods, clubs, or families. Unlike a neighbourhood, the state
must be involved in governance; unlike a family, all existing liberal states
are democratic. While a club provides a perhaps more compelling
analogy, individuals do not depend on club membership for basic
conditions of life. Thus, “clublessness” provides no parallel with
statelessness. Although Walzer relies only partially on each analogy,
inviting inconsistencies, the need to constantly shift analogies weakens
the argument. Neighbourhoods, clubs, and families do not hold
monopolies on coercive force, and cannot deploy armies to police their
boundaries. Walzer’s assertion that closure is necessary for communities
of character and for stability is not fully defended. His discussion of
mutual aid for asylees is an important qualifier to his theory, and an
expression of the liberal humanitarian consensus that I consider in detail
below.
What interests me about Walzer’s argument at this juncture is
the place of individuals as equal moral actors. To articulate a defence of
closed borders, Walzer has necessarily departed from liberalism’s
primary focus on the individual and its central concern with equality
between individuals. This point is not, of course, an attack on the
internal consistency of Walzer’s position. As a communitarian liberal,
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who,
not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as
a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
The 1967 Protocol on the Convention Definition removed the link between the refugee definition
and events prior to 1951: see Article I(2) of the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 31
January 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 at 268 (entered into force 4 October 1967).
17 Walzer, supra note 11 at 51. While Walzer does not discuss it, his theory does leave room
for an open-bordered community, if this openness was part of the community’s self-understanding.
Such a community would, nonetheless, presumably be impoverished by its lack of closure and hence,
in Walzer’s view, by its lack of character and stability.
18 Several analysts have criticized Walzer’s closed border argument in much more detail than I
do here: see, for example, J.A. Scanlan & O.T. Kent, “The Force of Moral Arguments for a Just
Immigration Policy in a Hobbesian Universe: The Contemporary American Example” in M.
Gibney, ed., Open Borders? Closed Societies? The Ethical and Political Issues (New York: Greenwood
Press, 1988) 61; P. Singer & R. Singer, “The Ethics of Refugee Policy” in ibid., 111; and J.H.
Carens, “Refugees and the Limits of Obligation” (1992) 6 Pub. Aff. Q. 31 [hereinafter “Refugees
and the Limits of Obligation”].
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Walzer necessarily privileges community as a value in and of itself and
membership in a community as a value for individuals.19 Indeed, he
opens his discussion of membership by stating that “[t]he primary good
that we distribute to one another is membership in some human
community.”20 Walzer’s argument shows that communitarianism, within
which a defence of closed borders can be coherently elaborated,
modifies the liberal commitment to the moral worth of the individual.
Necessarily, Walzer’s equality and justice are measured between
members of the community. Those outside the community are
fundamentally unequal. He would agree that his distributive justice
concept cannot be applied between members of a community and
outsiders.
The relationship between closed borders and equality is seen
more starkly in Donald Galloway’s work, as his defence of closed
borders for liberal communities includes a claim to adhere to Rawlsian
equality.21 While Galloway’s work has been less influential than
Walzer’s, his argument provides a more direct challenge to my project as
he does not assert a communitarian position, but claims instead that
“closed borders are consistent with ‘pure’ liberalism.”22 Galloway argues
that if the Rawlsian original position were adapted to an international
viewpoint, that is, if originalists were to choose whether and how to
organize human life into a state system, the state would be characterized
as a “self-help device for moral individuals,”23 a device to assist moral
individuals in meeting their independently determined goals and duties.
Despite his ambivalence towards communitarians, he relies on analogies
that resemble Walzer’s: “The liberal state takes on an appearance
similar to that of the familiar, voluntary association, promoting the
multifarious purposes of its members, and balancing these against its
19 For a differing view, see F.G. Whelan, “Citizenship and Freedom of Movement: An Open
Admission Policy?” in Gibney, ed., supra note 18, 3. Whelan argues that liberalism requires that
communities have open borders, but when combined with communitarianism, statism, or
democracy, closed borders are morally justified. The problem with Whelan’s approach is that it
divorces liberalism from political context, while it is only in political context that questions of
immigration can arise.
20 Walzer, supra note 11 at 31.
21 See “Liberalism, Globalism, and Immigration,” supra note 7; D. Galloway, ‘‘Strangers and
Members: Equality in an Immigration Setting” (1994) 7 Can. J. L. & Jur. 149 [hereinafter
“Strangers and Members”]; and D. Galloway, “Three Models of (In)equality” (1993) 38 McGill L.J.
64. For additional commentary on Galloway’s work, see C. Dauvergne, “Beyond Justice: The
Consequences of Liberalism for Immigration Law” (1997) 10 Can. J. L. & Jur. 323.
22 “Liberalism, Globalism, and Immigration,” supra note 7 at 286.
23 Ibid. at 294.
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members’ moral duties.”24 Individual members have no duty to strangers
beyond the duty of mutual aid. As the liberal state exists to promote the
various aims of individuals with these duties, its existence cannot create
a right of outsiders to become members. Galloway further asserts that
individuals in the original position would not believe that they had
unlimited freedom of movement, as this would infringe the autonomy of
others, which they would bind themselves to respect.
Galloway introduces equality into his argument through the
claim that, while a liberal state need not permit immigration, if it does, it
must do so in a non-discriminatory way. But he defends exclusionary
immigration law creating “us” and “them” groups as a necessary and
non-discriminatory aspect of liberalism.25 Galloway advocates a “human
dignity” model of equality as the appropriate measure of non-
discrimination for the immigration context. He states that
[a] key implication of the dignity model is that a rule applying to applicants for entry will
be discriminatory if (i) its impact is such that a subgroup identified by a characteristic has
experienced, by reason of this characteristic, stereotyping, disdain or hatred towards
individuals, or (ii) if it imposes conditions upon entry which in themselves can be
interpreted as an attack upon the person’s dignity.26
This view of equality aims at countering particular forms of
discrimination that liberal human rights law attempts to address, but
falls short of preserving the liberal commitment to the equal moral
worth of all individuals. Galloway’s argument that distinctions between
an “us” and a “them” group are neutral is particularly difficult to
accept.27 He bases this assertion on liberalism’s account of a
differentiation between self and other as an early step in formation of
societies.28 The two distinctions are not truly parallel. To enter into a
political community, a self must recognize others with whom to
cooperate. The “us” group is then composed of differentiated
individuals, of “others.” This premise does not extrapolate neatly to the
state system. A state, or political community, does not need other
communities to bring it into existence by differentiating it. Even in
24 Ibid. at 295.
25 Ibid. at 301.
26 “Strangers and Members,” supra note 21 at 167-68.
27 See M. Minow, Making All The Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law (Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990). Minow details the insidious hierarchies and discrimination
created by legal boundaries in a variety of contexts.
28 See “Liberalism, Globalism, and Immigration,” supra note 7 at 301.
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Galloway’s analysis, a state emerges as a self-help organization to meet
certain aims of cooperating individuals. One state may theoretically exist
in the absence of other states, but a “self” cannot be differentiated—or
brought into being—without creating “others.” The us/them boundary at
the border of the nation is necessarily hierarchical. Outsiders are not
equal in a number of ways familiar in liberal theory: they do not have
equal opportunity, equal access to basic liberties, or equal distribution of
certain values. Galloway’s argument that exclusion is not discriminatory
depends on accepting that the “us” group has a superior claim to these
entitlements.
Even if we were to overlook these discrepancies and accept
Galloway’s version of equality as sufficient to meet the standards of
classical liberalism, it is too narrow to provide a standard of justice that
responds to many of the most difficult practical questions in immigration
law. The two factors that he proposes, historical discrimination and
detriment to dignity, provide little guidance when faced with issues such
as whether to favour family immigrants or skilled immigrants; whether
parents should be part of the “family class;” or whether successful
entrepreneurs should be able to “buy” entry visas. Galloway draws his
own examples from the realm of refugee law, where his reasoning
requires less attenuation. This reinforces the liberal humanitarian
consensus. The theoretical argument about open or closed borders has
humanitarian admissions as its focus and responds most cogently to
humanitarian scenarios.
The erosion of liberal equality that is demonstrated by Walzer
and defended by Galloway is the primary reason that liberal arguments
for closed borders are not sufficient to attract large-scale consensus in
liberal societies. Part of liberalism’s promise, particularly popular in its
mass-consumption form, is the respect for individual equality. To accept
a defence of closed borders that undermines universal equality is
unacceptable to many liberals. This refusal is a factor behind a consistent
but not majoritarian general public support for immigration, even in
difficult economic times.29 The closed border argument departs from
this central liberal tenet and therefore loses some of its resonance in
liberal societies. The alternative position, that liberalism requires open
borders, is vulnerable in a similar way. Proponents of open borders also
depart from a core liberal value, making the closed/open border debate
particularly intractable.
29 See F. Hawkins, Critical Years in Immigration: Canada and Australia Compared (Kingston,
Ont.: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1989) c. 4.
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The assertion that liberalism mandates open borders begins from
the commitment to individual freedom and equality. With these values
as a focus, the open borders position is treated almost as a self-evident
presumption by some theorists. Frederick Whelan expresses the logic of
the argument this way:
[I]t seems clear from the outset that a moral theory that sets out to attend to the claims of
all human beings as such, on an equal basis, is going to have some difficulty in justifying
borders that set off groups of people from each other and act as barriers to the free
movement of individuals.30
This assertion is most acceptable when liberalism is treated as primarily
a moral rather than a political theory, a distinction that Whelan explores
in some detail. The problem with this formulation, however, is that
immigration laws raise questions of community rather than individual
morality. Some proponents of open borders do, nonetheless, state their
claim in political terms. John Scanlan and O.T. Kent write that “in a
truly liberal polity, then, national borders would simply lack moral
significance. Relying upon them to argue for immigration restriction
would offend basic principles of justice.”31
Carens provides more insight into the liberal argument for open
borders by treating it as contentious rather than assumed and by
analyzing various dimensions of the position.32 He argues that three
strands of contemporary liberalism (utilitarian, Rawlsian, and
Nozickian) each support an argument for open borders, or at least for
significant reductions in present immigration restrictions. He claims an
open borders position is inherent to liberalism in part because these
varying theories converge on this point.
Carens draws out his reasoning using Rawls’s original position,
arguing that in a global version of the original position, where
individuals did not know their place of birth or which society they would
be a member of, they would insist on the right to migrate as one of the
basic liberties.33 Carens argues that a parallel can be drawn between
liberal arguments for open immigration and liberal arguments of an
30 Whelan, supra note 19 at 7.
31 Scanlan & Kent, supra note 18 at 68.
32 See “Aliens and Citizens,” supra note 1; J.H. Carens, “Membership and Morality:
Admission to Citizenship in Liberal Democratic States” in Brubaker, ed., supra note 2, 31
[hereinafter “Membership and Morality”]; J.H. Carens, “Who Belongs? Theoretical and Legal
Questions About Birthright Citizenship in the United States” (1987) 37 U.T.L.J. 413; and
“Refugees and the Limits of Obligation,” supra note 18.
33 See “Aliens and Citizens,” supra note 1 at 258.
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earlier era for extension of the franchise, and problematically asserts
that restrictions infringe classical liberalism in the same way.34 While
open borders would not mean no distinctions between members and
non-members, he states that
[f]or people in a different moral tradition, one that assumed fundamental moral
differences between those inside the society and those outside, restrictions on
immigration might be easy to justify. Those who are other simply might not count, or at
least not count as much. But we cannot dismiss the aliens on the ground that they are
other, because we are the products of a liberal culture.35
Carens takes issue with Walzer’s communitarian closed borders and
would accept only the narrowest restrictions on immigration. Whelan
also draws on Rawls in concluding that “pure” liberalism requires open
borders. He asserts that freedom of international movement could, as
Carens suggests, be considered a basic liberty, that fair equal
opportunity could require all jobs be open to individuals regardless of
nationality, and that the difference principle could require the maximum
number of equally possible admissions to a polity.36
The view that open borders are a self-evident conclusion of
liberal theory, derived from individual equality, requires us to view
liberalism as a moral theory, rather than a political and moral theory.
This tenuous distinction loses its power to provide insights when we
consider that liberal theory in the immigration context is foremost about
political organization. Liberalism has never been asserted theoretically
without the presumption of a state. While Whelan separates “pure”
liberalism from liberal statism, liberal democracy, and liberal
communitarianism, the separation is artificial. Once the political
community is reasserted an important aspect of the open borders
argument falls away.
Carens does not remove the political community from his theory,
but, as was the case with closed border advocates, he minimizes a central
liberal value. Carens rejects the distinction between self and other that
Galloway argues is central to liberalism. While Galloway inappropriately
applies this dichotomy to the existence of states, Carens fails to
appreciate the relationship between liberal individuals and the societies
they form. He argues that moral liberal individuals do not discount the
34 This assertion ignores the border of the nation entirely.
35 “Aliens and Citizens,” supra note 1 at 269 [emphasis in original].
36 See Whelan, supra note 19 at 7-9. Whelan continues his analysis, at 23, by stating that
restrictions to immigration can be morally justified when liberalism is combined with statism,
democracy, or communitarianism, which account for existing liberal polities.
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moral worth of non-members of the community. This ignores liberal
explanations of societal formation. Rawls’s social theory is a
contemporary social contract, as Carens acknowledges when drawing on
it.37 Members join to form societies in order to gain certain benefits.
Liberal selves join with particular others, in distinction from alien others.
The result is a gain for all those joining the contract. This gain
distinguishes members from outsiders. If this distinction had no value,
and was not discriminating, membership would be meaningless. It clearly
is not, even in Carens’s view. When Carens asserts that an insider-
outsider distinction does not establish a moral hierarchy, he not only
unduly minimizes the importance of the polity in liberal theory, he
ignores the insidious discrimination that is inherent to these distinctions.
The failure of both closed and open border advocates to
establish their arguments within the confines of classical liberalism has
important consequences for their debate. Classical liberal theory does
not provide an answer to whether the community’s borders should be
open or closed.38 Both arguments are supported by certain aspects of
liberalism. Liberal theories of justice have been elaborated against the
background assumption of a closed community. They are ill-adapted to
the questions arising in the immigration context. To this extent, the
search for “just” immigration law in liberal society is futile. Liberal
societies rely upon liberal conceptions of justice. As these do not
accommodate the immigration setting, immigration law is left in a zone
of amorality, an area where the core liberal values of the society do not
indicate a resolution. Popular debates about immigration remain
fractious. Indeed, the philosophy that underpins the liberal democracies
and percolates through the popular cultures of the Western states most
immigrants target, cannot provide a basis for societal consensus. This
amorality is not the same as immorality. It is equally impossible to draw
the conclusion that liberal immigration laws are “unjust.” Neither
conclusion is possible, hence the label “amoral.” Many individuals in
these nations feel passionately about immigration and would argue
fervently for morally-based legal change. Nonetheless, these moral
claims are personal and cannot reach political consensus as long as
broad-based liberalism remains the hegemonic popular and political
discourse. I now turn to consider the causes and consequences of the
absence of a liberal justice standard.
37 See “Aliens and Citizens,” supra note 1 at 270.
38 See M. Tushnet, “Immigration Policy in Liberal Political Theory” in Schwartz, ed., supra
note 14, 147. Tushnet argues that the explanation for this theoretical lacuna is largely that
immigration has become a social issue only relatively recently. 
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III.  A CENTRAL TENSION IN LIBERALISM
The tension in the liberal debate about closed or open borders
parallels the central tension in liberalism that James Fishkin considered
to constitute the limit of liberal obligations.39 The immigration debate in
liberal societies provides an example of Fishkin’s thesis that the core
liberal commitments to impartiality and individuality are in unresolvable
conflict. The attractiveness of the idea that we are bound to all other
individuals through a minimal duty of mutual aid (in Fishkin’s terms,
“minimal altruism”) is the core of liberal morality. To each person, we
have a minimal duty to save his or her life when the cost to us of doing so
would be negligible. Yet on a large scale, even such a minimal obligation
pushes us to accept heroic personal sacrifice that liberalism’s
commitment to individual autonomy will not countenance. Fishkin relied
on donations to famine relief as his primary reasoning device, but the
open borders argument has the same features. The modern debate about
immigration law in liberal democracies takes place against the often
unstated, but potentially quite truthful, spectre of millions of individuals
wanting to become members of these wealthy societies. At some point,
far beyond existing immigration quotas in these nations,40 admitting
more people would decrease the standard of living of existing members.
To accept that immigration should be permitted until living conditions
have been equalized throughout the world is surely, in Fishkin’s terms, a
heroic stance. A similar equalization of living standards is postulated at
one extreme of the famine relief scenario. Fishkin bases his call for a re-
examination of liberal morality on this tension between liberalism’s dual
commitments to equality and to limits on individual moral sacrifice:
This argument also has a further implication for political theory in that the overload
problem exemplifies the incompatibility, at the large scale, of two central components of
liberalism: (a) impartiality or “equal concern and respect” and (b) individualism. Notions
of impartiality … press us toward acceptance of general obligations. Notions of
individualism require, or implicitly assume, limits on the moral demands that can be
made of each individual … .41
The two principles check each other with the result that we do not
require heroism as a standard of moral behaviour, and we permit moral
individuals a robust sphere of indifference within which their choice of
whether to respond compassionately to those in need is “free” in that it
39 See J.S. Fishkin, The Limits of Obligation (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982).
40 See Singer & Singer, supra note 18.
41 Fishkin, supra note 39 at 170 [emphasis in original].
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is morally neutral. The border argument fits well on the central axis
Fishkin describes: the open borders argument emphasizes impartiality,
while the closed borders position emphasizes the limits to individual
sacrifice that are inherent in individualism.
The intractability of the argument, and the central tension in
liberalism it reflects, do not justify rejecting liberal discourse about
immigration as a source of insight. Liberal hegemony in domestic and
international political spheres requires that we seek to understand
immigration debates in liberal terms. The limits of liberal theorizing
about immigration are important to this debate. International order is
built on a liberal infrastructure, and the prosperous countries attracting
aspiring immigrants are liberal democracies. This means that debates
about immigration law and policy use liberal terms whether they take
place in the political arena, the supermarket, or the university lecture
theatre. Efforts to move the argument away from liberal theory, to a
framework where questions of justice could perhaps be more easily
answered, lose their resonance in the face of liberalism’s hegemony.
Real consequences for a society’s members, and its new and would-be
immigrants, happen more often in the political arena and the
supermarket than in the lecture theatre. In the international arena,
liberal hegemony means immigration questions are tightly bound up
with state sovereignty. Consensus of any sort is hard to achieve. It is
therefore important to examine liberalism’s responses to immigration
questions rather than solely argue that liberal theory does not answer
these questions adequately.
The remainder of this article looks beyond the open or closed
border dilemma to discuss liberalism’s structuring of the immigration
debate. I first consider attempts to develop standards of justice that are
internal to the societies in question. I then examine the bifurcation of
the migration law question into immigration and refugee law, and the
centrality of humanitarianism to both of these branches of law. I
conclude by reflecting on the constitutive role of immigration law in
liberal society. Each discussion contributes to understanding why
attempts to establish liberal immigration policy on principled bases do
not alter the amorality of liberal immigration law. The basic structures of
immigration law result from the absence of a justice standard.
IV.  NARROW JUSTICE STANDARDS
One response to the absence of a liberal standard of justice that
informs decisions about what is fair between members and non-members
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of a society is to articulate standards for principled decisionmaking
within a particular society. While such standards cannot answer the
question of whether liberalism mandates open or closed borders, or
whether a particular policy is just from the perspective of an applicant
for admission, they provide a guard against capricious or self-serving
political decisionmaking. They also conform to the traditional liberal
tenet that questions of equality and justice are to be resolved within the
community. The justice, or fairness, established by such standards
applies to those who are already members of the society. That is, we
establish “fair” standards for admission given who we imagine ourselves
to be and what our aims as a nation are. This type of fairness standard
provides a way of arbitrating disputes about immigration that arise
because of the interests of sub-groups within the community. These
standards of justice are well-developed and conform to liberal
postulates. The problem is only in their almost xenophobic narrowness.
They define justice based on community norms when those to whom just
consideration is arguably most important in immigration matters are
outside the community.
Scanlan and Kent advocate standards of fairness for American
immigration law that draw on American political culture and recognize
the constraints of domestic politics:
[W]e will argue that the moral basis for establishing a restrictive immigration ceiling is, at
best, problematical. But we will suggest that the dominance of realpolitik concerns about
jobs, housing, environment, and standard of living make it impossible in any practical way
to bring this moral insight to bear on the political process. On the other hand, we will
show that other questions, including those involving the rights of racial minorities and
political asylum applicants are more amenable to politically effective moral advocacy, in
part because of their different effects on “native” interests, but, more important, because
they are so closely connected to fundamental American political and social concepts of
liberty and equality.42
They assert that liberalism requires open borders, but argue that this
morally just position is politically impossible. Pragmatic solutions are to
be sought by making arguments that resonate with American cultural
morality. What is just must be defined in narrow American terms.
Scanlan and Kent acknowledge that an open borders argument will not
win popular or political support in the United States, but claim that
policies that emphasize the human rights of immigration applicants and
asylum applicants’ need for political freedom will garner support. They
urge the expansion of admission quotas on these bases, rather than on
the basis of liberal justice. The standard for principled policy that they
42 Scanlan & Kent, supra note 18 at 64.
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develop depends explicitly on American political history and political
culture; it is designed to rally support among the American populace
rather than to act as a standard for liberal societies. As such, it is a
pragmatic stance, casting aside the search for an ideal in favour of policy
strategy. While Scanlan and Kent recognize the limitations of the
principles they articulate, they also appreciate that a great deal of
change in the directions they propose is possible before their principles
will cease to provide guidance. I have labelled their stance “narrow” or
“internal” because its point of departure is, “We are Americans, so this
is what fair immigration policy is for us.”
A similar, internally principled approach is put forward by
Andrew Shacknove, who stipulates that the principle of mutual aid
implies three positive duties towards refugees: (1) to avoid depriving
them of basic security, subsistence, and liberty, unless some actual
proximate and compelling interest of state is implicated; (2) to assume
responsibility for our own actions that directly deprive others of their
basic needs; and (3) to treat all persons whose lives are in jeopardy as
equal before the law.43 While these duties are articulated in universal
terms, they are internally based. In Shacknove’s analysis these principles
apply to people who are already within the borders of the nation
awaiting decisions about whether they will be permitted to remain. As
with Scanlan and Kent, important principled improvements in actual
practice could be made on the basis of Shacknove’s three duties.
Nonetheless, these duties do not address the important questions of
whether refugees should be admitted for permanent settlement at all,
who should be considered a refugee, and how many people should be
admitted. The case of immigrants is also beyond the scope of these
principles and is clearly beyond the reach of Shacknove’s argument. He
derives his position from liberalism’s minimal principle of moral duty
rather than from a conception of justice. To this extent, his argument is
pragmatic because he draws on an aspect of liberal theory that attracts
the most consensus in questions of immigration: the idea that some
people are so needy they cannot be turned away. His perspective is
narrow because compelling state interests trump even the basic
subsistence of refugee claimants. The interests of the “us” group have
enormous primacy.
Howard Adelman has developed a highly sophisticated model
for determining questions of justice in immigration and refugee law that
43 See A.E. Shacknove, “American Duties to Refugees: Their Scope and Limits” in Gibney,
ed., supra note 18, 131.
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provides an elaborate exemplar of a narrow standard.44 He asserts that
the universality of Rawls’s theory of justice means it ought to be
applicable to the immigration and refugee context, yet the rights
emphasis of Rawls’s theory makes it inappropriate for these questions.
Adelman develops a framework for just decisionmaking that shows how
immigration and refugee policy meets different aims within a society,
and that differing conceptions of justice prevail in relation to each of
these.45 He claims justice is not abstract and that we must look at actual
policy decisions to see which conceptions of justice underlie them: “[I]n
immigration policy, justice is achieved by adjudicating among various
utilities and normative rights criteria, as well as the capacity of the
society to absorb those immigrants and refugees.”46
Adelman views justice as a variable concept; its moral content is
determined by its context. He examines various types of immigration
decisions and considers how justice standards could be inserted into the
decisionmaking. This yields a set of principles for policymaking,
however, rather than a model of liberal justice. While ultimately of great
use to decisionmakers, in many instances his taxonomy of values driving
decisions is more explanatory than normative. For example, he discusses
how an ecological perspective can lead to support for either more or less
immigration depending on whether national or global ecology is
emphasized, and how economic self-interest can take policy in diverging
directions depending upon what other values are also considered.47
Adelman would agree that his aim is to articulate principles to guide
enlightened policymaking. The principles he outlines do, in some
instances, incorporate the perspective of admission applicants. What
Adelman ignores is that Rawlsian justice is inapplicable to the
immigration and refugee context because, as the open/closed borders
debate shows, Rawls assumes community and this assumption is not
easily cast aside. Adelman’s own work, like that of Scanlan and Kent and
of Shacknove, demonstrates that principled policymaking stems from the
values of one society and puts the needs of members first. He is
compelled to develop flexible principles because no liberal justice
44 See H. Adelman, “Justice, Immigration and Refugees” in H. Adelman et al., eds.,
Immigration and Refugee Policy: Australia and Canada Compared, vol. 1 (Carleton, Vic.: Melbourne
University Press, 1994) 63 [hereinafter “Justice, Immigration and Refugees”].
45 A similar type of analysis is seen in Jules Coleman and Sarah Harding’s essay, where justice
is also deduced from current practice: see J.L. Coleman & S.K. Harding, “Citizenship, the Demands
of Justice, and the Moral Relevance of Political Borders” in Schwartz, ed., supra note 14, 18.
46 “Justice, Immigration and Refugees,” supra note 44 at 70.
47 Ibid. at 72-73, 80.
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standard fits the context he is considering. By arguing that what is just
depends upon our goals (including our desire to be humanitarian) in a
given context, Adelman demonstrates that there is no one standard that
applies to immigration and that the goals of non-members are irrelevant
to “fair” policymaking.
Internal standards of justice are a crucially important device.
They articulate goals for immigration law and policy that, in practical
terms, would be a marked improvement on political reality. These
standards contribute more to the debate about pragmatic improvements
in the immigration realm than the more ethereal open/closed border
debate. They are more compelling to community members who
ultimately must make or support rules about admittance to the polity.
What I want to highlight about these views of just immigration law is
that their existence does not mean liberalism provides standards for
justice in immigration. Internal justice standards only address the
question of fairness from the perspective of society members. They
announce that certain laws are fair, if they are fair to all of “us.” To
speak of justice in this narrow sense does not affect the argument that
immigration law is amoral, and is beyond or, at the border of, liberal
conceptions of justice. Justice for those who will not be directly touched
by these laws is not a full conception of justice.
V.  REFUGEES AND OTHER IMMIGRANTS
One consequence of the positioning of immigration discourse
within liberalism is that there is an incongruity between popular
discourse about fairness in immigration law and the theoretical
propositions that I have analyzed to this point. Most of the popular
outcry is about fair immigration law, while most of the theoretical work is
about just refugee admissions. The liberal philosophical debate is
occurring at the margins of the popular concern in liberal societies. The
reason for this is embedded in the amorality of liberal immigration law
in the absence of a justice standard for liberal immigration discourse.
Although a standard is lacking, liberal immigration theorists do
agree on some points. Closed border liberals seeking to articulate what
is just in immigration law turn to the principle of mutual aid: an
individual has a duty to save the life of a stranger if he or she can do so
with minimal cost or risk to him or herself. The archetypal example is
the duty of a stranger to stop and save a drowning child when it would be
easily done. Fishkin emphasizes how minimal this duty is. Walzer and
Galloway both acknowledge that on the basis of the duty of mutual aid,
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refugee admissions must be an exception to their arguments for closed
borders. Open border theorists, seeking support for their view, develop
their arguments by taking the example of those most in need. As a result,
there is a convergence in open and closed border arguments around the
principle of assistance for those most in need: the principle of mutual
aid. There are doubtless some difficulties in adapting a moral duty of
individuals to save lives to an obligation upon states to admit outsiders.
Nonetheless, consensus around the use of this principle in this context
justifies analyzing the consequences of that consensus. In the case of the
most needy, admission to settle in a prosperous Western nation is
lifesaving.
It is because of the consensus that the duty of mutual aid is
applicable to the question of who should be admitted to a liberal society
that theoretical discussions of admission are largely devoted to refugees,
or at least to those considered in popular parlance as refugees (given the
narrowness of the legal definition). There is very little theoretical
discussion of whether and how those seeking permanent admission to a
prosperous country in order to gain a better job or to increase their
standard of living should be treated.48 The ironic problem with this is
that the vast majority of those admitted to settle in Western democracies
each year are not refugees, but immigrants.49 This is one way in which
the philosophical debate misses the mark. While the admission
controversy has its only point of consensus around admitting the most
needy, most of those in fact admitted do not fall into this category. Even
though in several ways the legal category “refugee” may not correspond
with neediness, need is the logic that underlies the category and the
debate about it. In the United States, Canada, and Australia—all of
48 The moral aspects of admission of guest workers have attracted considerable attention.
Guest workers, however, are not admitted to permanent settlement and therefore are not in the
same category as immigrants or refugees. The exploitative nature of guest worker policies is
discussed in Walzer, supra note 11 at 52-61; and “Membership and Morality,” supra note 32.
49 This is true even in countries that have international reputations for accepting refugees. In
Canada, the 1999 Immigration Plan targets admitting 22,100-29,300 refugees of a total 200,000-
225,000 admissions: see online: Canadian Annual Immigration Plan, 1999 <http://www.cic.gc.ca/
english/pub/anrep99e.html#plan1> (date accessed: 22 October 1999) [hereinafter CAIP]. In
Australia, the planning levels for 1998-1999 include 12,000 humanitarian admissions (of which 6,000
are to be refugees) and 68,000 non-humanitarian admissions: see online: Australian Department of
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs Website <http://www.immi.gov.au/facts/40human.htm#
program> (date accessed: 21 July 1999); and <http://www.immi.gov.au/facts/20progra.htm> (date
accessed: 22 October 1999) [hereinafter Non-humanitarian Admissions]. In the United States, in
1997, 626,378 immigrants in the family and employment categories arrived, and 112,158 refugees
and asylees were given permanent resident status: see online: Immigration to the United States in
Fiscal Year 1997 <http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/index.htmstatistics> (date
accessed: 5 October 1999) [hereinafter U.S. Immigration].
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which consider themselves nations of immigration and have organized
immigration programs—most migrants are admitted either because of
their potential economic benefit to the nation or because they have close
family there. In both Australia and Canada, the 1990s have been marked
by a debate about whether economic migration or family reunion
migration should be the larger group. There is no suggestion in public
debate that humanitarian migration should be anything but a distant
third category.50 The current popular immigration debate concerns
mostly how many immigrants should be admitted, not how many
refugees. In Australia, one popularly debated question is the extent to
which the culture is being influenced by Asian immigration. In the
Canadian press, concern is expressed about the impact on culture and
communities of an influx of wealthy Hong Kong Chinese. By contrast,
there is considerable societal consensus in both Canada and Australia
that genuine refugees should be admitted.51
One result of the liberal consensus over the mutual-aid principle
is that humanitarian scenarios are the core of theoretical concern with
migration. Another perhaps more disturbing aspect of liberal treatment
of migration is that the mutual-aid principle provides little real policy
guidance even for refugee law. While almost every theorist who weighs
questions of justice in immigration law finds that Western nations should
be admitting more refugees,52 how many more is an open question. The
mutual-aid principle simply pushes the debate away from admission to
the thornier question of numbers. This does little to reduce
intransigency. Renata Singer and Peter Singer develop a utilitarian
argument that the number of refugee admissions should be increased
until, considering the interests of the groups affected, the consequences
of further admissions would outweigh the benefits.53 Both Walzer, a
50 In both Canada and Australia, the economic group is currently larger than the family
reunion group as a result of policy changes in 1995 and 1997, respectively. In Canada, the economic
category targets for 1999 total 117,700-195,700 admissions, and the family category targets are
53,500-58,300: see CAIP, supra note 49. In Australia, the targets for 1999 and 2000 are 35,000 and
32,000, respectively: see Non-humanitarian Admissions, supra note 49. The United States maintains
a strong emphasis on family-linked migration, with 535,771 family category admissions in 1997,
compared to 90,607 admissions in the “employment-based preferences” category: see U.S.
Immigration, supra note 49.
51 See Hawkins, supra note 29.
52 Of the theorists discussed above, this position is taken explicitly by Walzer, Adelman,
Carens, Scanlan and Kent, Singer and Singer, and Tushnet, and implied by Galloway.
53 See Singer & Singer, supra note 18. They illustrate their argument by stating, at 125, that
doubling Australia’s target refugee intake of 12,000 (1986-1987) would leave 12,000 people clearly
better off and would have no clear effect on others. This doubling could likely continue for some
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closed border advocate, and Scanlan and Kent, open border proponents,
offer the vague concept of “state capacity” as a limit for refugee
admissions. There is clearly still room to move towards fairer policy in
Western nations by admitting more refugees. Nonetheless, by focusing
on refugees, the question of fairness in immigration is sidelined.
Immigrant numbers are far greater, and many immigrants are driven by
circumstances that would qualify them as “needy” in liberal theory, but
not as “refugees” in international law.
A further problem with the division of migration law into
immigrant and refugee streams is that it facilitates the assumption that
immigrants are not the most needy. This assumption provides a moral
justification for theorists, on the basis of the mutual-aid principle, to
devote more attention to refugees. The present distinction between
immigration and refugee law was cemented by post-World War II efforts
by the Western powers to address the needs of displaced persons in
Europe.54 The main response was the 1951 Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees.55 The definition of refugee set out in this
Convention has become the standard in international law and is used in
the domestic law of the prosperous Western nations considered here. A
refugee is a person who is already outside his or her country of
nationality and who is fleeing persecution on the basis of one or more
enumerated grounds. Thus, being a refugee is not necessarily related to
starvation or destitution. While many refugees do fit the vision of those
most in need that is conjured as part of the theoretic discussion, others
who are equally or more destitute are not refugees.56 Conversely, some
successful refugee claimants do not fit our vision of need in the least.57
While many “official” refugees do want to move to new countries and
time until any detrimental effects could be noticed, and still longer until those detriments
outweighed the benefits to those admitted.
54 See J.C. Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status (Toronto: Butterworths, 1991) at 6-10; and
J.C. Hathaway, “Preface” in J.C. Hathaway, ed., Reconceiving International Refugee Law (The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1997) xvii.
55 See Convention, supra note 16.
56 See P. Tuitt, False Images: Law’s Construction of the Refugee (London: Pluto Press, 1996).
This issue is at the root of competing definitions of refugee, and underlies growing use of the term
“de facto refugee.” These alternative definitions have made few if any inroads in the refugee law of
prosperous liberal democracies.
57 See Canada (A.G.) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 [hereinafter Ward]. One of the most
important Canadian cases on refugee law, Ward involved a refugee claimant who was a former
member of the Irish National Liberation Army, a paramilitary terrorist group the appellant
described in his testimony as “more violent than the Irish Republican Army.” Mr. Ward was held
not to be a refugee because his dual nationality meant he had an alternative home. His former
terrorist activities were not considered a bar to his claim of refugee status.
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establish new homes, most are hoping to be able to return to their
homelands once the events that drove them away have passed.58 This
shows the difficulty of using “refugee” as an alternative term for those
most in need. The refugee definition is largely the result of self-
interested negotiation among those prosperous liberal democracies
where the debate about fair immigration policy is now raging.
Adherence to the narrow definition allows the calculation of the number
of refugees in the world at present to be limited by these nations.59
Although at both a philosophical and a popular level the possibility of
establishing consensus is much greater on refugee issues than on
immigration issues, this consensus bypasses the important questions of
fairness in immigrant admission decisions. Hence, those decisions are
left in the realm of amorality.
Liberalism’s theoretical cohesion around the principle of mutual
aid as applied in questions of migration leads to a bifurcation in the law
between refugees and immigrants. This bifurcation in turn obscures the
problems these two labels mask, making it all too easy to consider one
group needy and the other not. The division is also paralleled by a
divergence between popular and philosophical discourses on migration,
leaving each impoverished without the insights of the other. The two
discourses seem at first glance to be related, but in fact address few
common points. The debate about fairness in immigration goes critically
and theoretically unexamined, despite the concentration of popular
angst in this area. What the mutual-aid principle does ensure, however,
is that humanitarianism is a core concept in Western immigration laws.
VI.  HUMANITARIANISM IN IMMIGRATION
AND REFUGEE LAW
Humanitarianism has become the defining mark of immigration
and refugee law in Western democracies. Nations view themselves as
humanitarian, and have or seek international reputations for
humanitarianism.60 Humanitarianism is the term describing all the best
58 See J.C. Hathaway & R.A. Neve, “Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A
Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection” (1997) 10 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 115.
59 See Tuitt, supra note 56.
60 See Canada, Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2, s. 3(g), which states that one of the
objectives of the Act is “to fulfil Canada’s international legal obligations with respect to refugees
and to uphold its humanitarian tradition with respect to the displaced and the persecuted.” See also
Scanlan & Kent, supra note 18 at 63, in which the authors write of the humanitarian phenomenon
that “[t]he myth of American generosity is well established where immigration is concerned.”
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and most generous elements of liberal immigration laws. It sums up the
emotional appeal of “give us your huddled masses” and defines our
willingness to share our prosperity. Liberal humanitarianism, which is
the pride of many nations that have comparatively open borders and are
important international actors in questions of refugee assistance, is
based on inequality rather than justice. The central role of
humanitarianism in immigration law makes the search for fair law and
policy more difficult because it emphasizes beneficence despite being
ostensibly derived from duty.
Humanitarianism is viewed as the core virtue in immigration and
refugee law. When we label a law humanitarian, we label it as good, fair,
or just. But humanitarianism and justice are not the same. The
difference between the two points again to liberalism’s failure to yield a
standard for assessing justice in migration law. Humanitarianism
provides a stand-in for justice while reinforcing the boundary between an
“us” group and a “them” group. Humanitarianism differs from justice
because it is grounded in inequality. Justice is a standard that
implies—and applies—equality between individuals. Humanitarianism is
the opposite. In the case of migration law, we have something that they
do not: membership in a prosperous state. Humanitarianism in
migration law functions only because of the profound inequalities
between members and non-members.
 Humanitarianism is central to immigration and refugee law
because of the liberal consensus about the principle of mutual aid. This
individual moral duty both becomes the basis for a nation’s moral
commitments and reinforces the inequality that makes humanitarianism
possible. Recall that it derives from the idea that individuals are morally
bound to save the lives of others when they would suffer little or no risk
or loss to do so. There is a profound inequality between someone whose
life is in grave danger and one who can save him or her with little effort;
between the paradigmatic drowning child and capable adult. The
imbalance is clear. This inequality is at the heart of the best impulses in
liberal sentiments about migration. Humanitarianism is a virtue that a
nation, on behalf of its members, expresses toward non-members.
Keeping humanitarianism as the central concept in immigration
and refugee law ensures that the law is about what “we” can give to
“them.” Humanitarianism is not a standard of obligation, as justice
would be, but rather of charity. Humanitarianism defines us as good
when we are able to meet the standard, and justifiable when we are not.
As is the case with the principle of mutual aid, humanitarianism is very
flexible. It does not provide principled guidance about whom to admit
when. Depending on subjective perceptions of state capacity, the
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obligation is minimal, entailing actions that can be taken with no risk or
loss. It is well suited to the ways liberal societies manipulate their
immigration law; it can expand and contract easily with the domestic
political environment. Fishkin’s threshold of heroism, beyond which
actions are considered heroic rather than obligatory, can be placed
indeed quite low. Canada, for example, has been internationally praised
for its commitment to refugees and enjoys an international reputation as
humanitarian, yet addresses fewer refugee claims per capita than the
average in Western nations.61 The inequality that humanitarianism
enshrines reinforces differences between members and others, providing
a mirror image of the self/other distinction that both Galloway and
Carens argue is benign, but which expresses an insidious hierarchy.
Although humanitarianism is a feature of immigration and
refugee law in Western nations, it is important to understand the context
it is set in. Immigration laws are highly restrictive documents. They are
about letting a few in, but keeping most out.62 Despite the extent to
which humanitarianism dominates the rhetoric about migration, just as
mutual aid dominates theoretical discussions of closed borders, it is the
exception rather than the rule in migration laws. As liberal migration law
occupies an amoral plane, the claim to humanitarianism is subject to
little scrutiny. Humanitarianism parallels the threshold of heroism: we
are good simply by being humanitarian. There is no standard available to
judge whether a nation is admitting a “fair” number of immigrants or
refugees; no examination of whether those admitted are really the most
needy. Humanitarianism is an act of grace that any nation can claim to
make. Humanitarianism is an exception to the general tenor of these
laws, despite the amount of talk about it.
61 See “Justice, Immigration and Refugees,” supra note 44 at 90: Canada has an average of 1
claimant per 1,000 of population, compared with an average of 1 per 850 across Western nations.
The majority of the world’s refugees are not in Western nations, but in places literally on the border
of the major refugee-producing countries of Africa and Asia.
62 One example is provided by the Canadian Immigration Act, supra note 60. If an immigration
applicant has been refused a permanent resident visa in a number of categories, his or her sponsor
within Canada can appeal the decision on the basis of error or on “humanitarian and compassionate
grounds.” That is, once it has been established that an applicant does not meet the criteria—does
not deserve entry by the standards we have set—he or she may apply for an act of grace. Similarly,
in sections 351 and 417 of the Commonwealth of Australia Migration Act, 1958 (Cth) the minister
may personally alter a review tribunal’s decision. While these sections do not refer to
humanitarianism, they provide an avenue for executive acts of grace and are used in practice in this
way. The basic premise of immigration law is that non-citizens—non-members—do not have a right
of entry. Discretionary exceptions to this rule can be made. Humanitarianism is one permissible
category of discretion.
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 Examining the nature of humanitarianism reinforces the
argument that liberalism cannot provide a standard of justice for
immigration law. Humanitarianism is a virtue that is at home amidst
amoral immigration law. It defines a morality of beneficence and
bestowal rather than equality and justice. Understanding how and why
humanitarianism is central to immigration and refugee issues helps one
to understand which arguments will resonate within liberal cultures. As
Scanlan and Kent argue, appealing to a tradition of generosity, and not
to a sense of justice, can sway public sentiment in immigration matters.63
Because the successful arguments must rely upon an impulse towards
heroism, towards doing more than is necessary, it is difficult to make
arguments that more non-humanitarian immigrants should be admitted.
These arguments will only succeed when they are rooted in economic
self-interest, or when the immigrants in question can be portrayed as
sufficiently needy to capture the liberal humanitarian spirit. Being
humanitarian allows the “us” group to take pride in its actions; to feel
good about itself. Those seeking admission are in the unequal position
of any seeker of mercy or grace. This is portrayed in the structure of
international refugee law where there is not under any circumstances a
right to admission, only a right not to be returned to certain kinds of
horrific conditions.64 As they are asking for a gift in a realm with no
justice standard, they cannot assert a right or claim to be equals.
VII.  CONCLUSION
Liberal immigration law exists in a realm of amorality and is
dominated by a rhetoric of humanitarianism. As liberal justice measures
do not apply to immigration laws, these laws are outside liberal
morality—beyond the moral system of the societies they are situated in.
Notwithstanding this, liberal theory shapes immigration law in important
ways. The liberal consensus around the minimal principle of mutual aid,
within the migration context, means that philosophical discussions of just
migration are dominated by discussions of refugees, and that liberal
63 An example of this type of appeal is found in the comments by the Australian minister for
immigration, referring to an Australian woman of Vietnamese origin named Young Australian of
the Year for 1997: see The Honourable P. Ruddock, Address (National Press Club, 18 March 1998)
[unpublished], in which the minister said that “[t]hose who applauded this young woman, not only
applauded her individual courage and achievements, but, I suspect, applauded themselves for being
members of a community that, as she said in her acceptance speech, welcomed her so
unquestioningly.”
64 See Convention, supra note 16, art. 33.
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migration laws use humanitarianism as a stand-in for justice. This has
important consequences for the way we think about migration laws, as
humanitarianism and justice have little in common. Humanitarianism is
a gift; justice an entitlement. Justice rests on a view of equality and
similarity between individuals: humanitarianism rests on a profound
inequality between haves and have-nots. As such, humanitarianism
emphasizes the “us/them” line drawn at the border of the community,
and is therefore in harmony with, rather than exceptional to, restrictive
immigration laws.
Humanitarianism, of course, remains an important liberal virtue.
A great deal of reform in immigration and refugee law could be achieved
by making laws more humanitarian, more generous. As the theorists
canvassed here have discussed, most contemporary immigration rules
are unjust by narrow internal standards as well as non-humanitarian in
many respects. The argument therefore is not to reject humanitarianism,
but rather to understand fully how it fits into the liberal framework of
international order and to appreciate the inherent limitations of arguing
in humanitarian terms. The core tension in liberal thought between
individualism and equality means that we cannot achieve a lasting
consensus in liberal democratic societies to answer the question “how
many is just.” The fragility of the humanitarian consensus means that
any humanitarian action is valued as good, obscuring examination of
who are truly the most needy. Reform of immigration law and policy
cannot be achieved by aiming to resolve this intransigence; there simply
is no answer. The pragmatic approach must be to cast arguments in
humanitarian terms, accepting that these terms have consequences of
inequality.
Beyond the pragmatic, there of course remains the visionary
argument that both liberalism and the liberal state are unable to respond
to current global population pressures. Moving the argument onto this
plane seems an obvious choice from one perspective, but risks ignoring
liberalism’s decisive hegemony in global affairs and in the legal culture
of those nations with the most to protect by closing their borders. The
visionary argument should not be pursued without its pragmatic parallel,
else accusations of irrelevant theorizing will be well founded.
